What should we expect from innovation? A model-based assessment of the environmental and mitigation cost implications of climate-related R&D by Bosetti, Valentina et al.
Energy Economics 33 (2011) 1313–1320
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r.com/ locate /enecoWhat should we expect from innovation? A model-based assessment of the
environmental and mitigation cost implications of climate-related R&D☆
Valentina Bosetti a,⁎, Carlo Carraro b, Romain Duval c, Massimo Tavoni d
a Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and CMCC, Italy
b Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, University of Venice, CEPR, CESifo and CMCC, Italy
c OECD Economics Department, France
d Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Princeton Environmental Institute and CMCC, Italy☆ This paper is part of the research work being ca
Development Programme of the Fondazione Eni Enrico M
to OECD for ﬁnancial support. The views expressed i
authors, and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the OEC
⁎ Corresponding author at: FEEM, Cso Magenta 63 2
0252036983; fax: +39 0252036946.
E-mail address: Valentina.bosetti@feem.it (V. Bosett
0140-9883/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. Al
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2011.02.010a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 9 March 2010
Received in revised form 11 February 2011
Accepted 16 February 2011
Available online 5 March 2011
JEL classiﬁcation:
H0
H3
H4
Q32
Keywords:
Climate change
Environmental policy
Energy R&D fund
Stabilization costsThis paper addresses two basic issues related to technological innovation and climate stabilization objectives:
can innovation policies be effective in stabilizing climate? To what extent can innovation policies complement
carbon pricing (taxes or permit trading) and improve the economic efﬁciency of a mitigation policy package?
To answer these questions, we use an integrated assessment model with multiple externalities and an
endogenous representation of the technical progress in the energy sector. We evaluate a range of innovation
policies, both as stand-alone and in combination with other mitigation policies. Our analysis indicates that
innovation policies alone are unlikely to stabilize global concentration and temperature. As for the beneﬁts of
combining climate and innovation policies, we ﬁnd efﬁciency gains of 10% (6 USD Trillions in net present
value terms) for a stringent climate policy, and 30% (3 USD Trillions) for a milder one. However, such gains are
reduced when more plausible (sub-optimal) global innovation policy arrangements are considered.rried out by the Sustainable
attei. The authors are grateful
n this paper are those of the
D.
0123, Milano, Italy. Tel.: +39
i).
l rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The issue of the role and potential effectiveness of technological
change for mitigating climate change has gained momentum in both
the literature and the political debate over the past decade. Despite
the many uncertainties around the magnitude of the impacts of
technological change on mitigation costs, there is now broad
agreement that innovation will be required to foster the needed
decarbonisation of the economy. Furthermore, in the presence of
both environmental and innovation externalities, the optimal set of
climate policy instruments should include explicit R&D and possibly
technology diffusion policies, in addition to carbon pricing policies
that stimulate new technology purely as a side effect of internalising
the environmental externality (Jaffe et al., 2005; Bennear andStavins, 2007). On the other hand, relying on R&D alone might be
not sufﬁcient to achieve stringent targets and/or to minimise
mitigation costs, because such an approach would provide no direct
incentives for the adoption of new technologies and, by focusing on
the long term, would miss near-term opportunities for cost-effective
emissions reductions (Philibert, 2003; Sandén and Azar, 2005;
Fisher, 2008).
Against this background, innovation and technology policies have
received considerable attention from policy makers in the past few
years. Proposals of international technology agreements have been
put forward, that would encompass domestic and international
policies to foster R&D and knowledge-sharing (Newell, 2008).
Innovation strategies have also been analysed in the context of
climate coalition formation, suggesting that they are indispensable for
improving the robustness of international agreements to control
climate change (Barrett, 2003). On the policy side, some climate-
related scientiﬁc and technology agreements have emerged, including
the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the Asia Paciﬁc Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate, and the International
Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy. Most recently, the accord
signed in Copenhagen at COP15 envisages a network of “Climate
Innovation Centres” to facilitate collaboration on clean technologies
between developed and developing nations.
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change, there is so far limited quantitative evidence on the role that
innovation policies should play in a climate stabilisation policy
package, as well as on the particular R&D areas that should be
targeted. Popp (2006) has shown that combining carbon pricing and
R&D policies can yield welfare gains, but that these are modest with
respect to the optimal carbon tax case. Fischer and Newell (2008)
ﬁnd that an optimal portfolio of policies that includes, among
others, emissions pricing and R&D can achieve signiﬁcant efﬁciency
gains.
Energy-economy-climate models used to evaluate mitigation
policies have incorporated innovation mechanisms such as R&D
investments only to a limited extent. This is a drawback, since the
optimal policy mix is likely to depend on the returns to scale of energy
technologies that are subject to learning (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan,
2006), and that are determined by the evolution of the whole energy
system. Also, the limited analysis available of R&D investments
required to comply with climate stabilisation objectives (Schock et al.,
1999; Davis and Owens, 2003; Nemet and Kammen, 2007) has been
carried out mostly outside the realm of general equilibrium models.
The main objective of this paper is to bring innovative input to the
debate on the role of technology policy for climate change mitigation,
focusing on the interplay between innovation and carbon pricing
policies using the rich set-up allowed by integrated assessment
models. To this end, we investigate several potential intervention
strategies, with technology policies being used either as a substitute
or as a complement to carbon pricing.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief overview of themodel used in this paper,WITCH, focusing on the
various channels of endogenous technological change featured in the
model and the types of innovation policies that can be assessed.
Section 3 looks at the climate effectiveness of innovation policies, i.e.
at the extent to which such policies alone can bring about emission
reductions. Section 4 then turns to the economic effectiveness of
innovation policies, i.e. the extent to which they can lower the
economic costs of a climate policy package aimed at meeting a given
climate change mitigation target. We assess the potential economic
efﬁciency gains from hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies
relative to a pure carbon-pricing approach, and compare these
potential efﬁciency gains to those achievable in practice when
considering politically more realistic – but sub – optimal – policy
combinations. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarising its main
results.
2. Endogenous technological change and innovation policy options
in WITCH
The analysis presented in the paper is carried out using the World
Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model, an energy-
economy-climate model developed by the climate change group at
FEEM. The model has been used extensively for economic analysis of
climate change policies.1
WITCH is a computable macro-economic model with an in-built
representation of the energy sector, thus belonging to the class of
fully integrated (hard link) hybrid models. The economy follows an
optimal growth model in which the regions that populate the world
(12 macro-regions in the present paper) maximize welfare –
measured as a function of consumption – intertemporally over a
long horizon (the model is run here until 2150).2 The model tracks1 See www.witchmodel.org for a list of applications and papers.
2 The dynamic nature of the model naturally raises the question of the choice of the
discount rate. In the model, the social time preference starts at 3%, declining over time.
However, since most of the analysis is undertaken in a cost-effective framework rather
than a cost-beneﬁt one, the effect of discounting on results is negligible.investments and expenditures for the main carbon mitigation
technologies and carriers, selecting the portfolio which is dynami-
cally optimal given perfect foresight. Production is represented via
nested constant elasticity of substitution functions, which allows to
track the greenhouse gas emissions generated by burning fossil fuels
or by using land. A simpliﬁed climate model computes the
greenhouse gas radiative forcing associated with these emissions.
Additional model description can be found in the Appendix to this
paper.
WITCH has two main distinguishing features that are especially
relevant in the context of the present analysis. The ﬁrst one is a
representation of endogenous technical change in the energy sector.
Advancements in a range of carbon mitigation technologies are
described by both innovation and diffusion processes. Learning-by-
Researching (LbR) and Learning-by-Doing (LbD) shape the optimal
R&D and technology deployment responses to given climate policies.
Speciﬁcally, the investment costs of renewable power generation and
breakthrough low-carbon technologies are lowered by investments in
dedicated R&D and technology deployment via a two-factor learning
curve (see Appendix). R&D investments also increase the energy
efﬁciency of the overall production function by contributing to the
accumulation of knowledge capital that substitutes for energy
demand.
In terms of innovation market failures, energy-related knowledge
in a country depends not only on the country's own R&D investments
but also on those made by others, via international spillovers. For a
given region, the magnitude of such spillovers depends on the
distance of its R&D knowledge stock (cumulative past R&D) to the
frontier, but also on its absorptive capacity which depends positively
on its knowledge stock. This gives rise to a bell-shaped relationship
between a country's R&D knowledge stock and spillovers, with the
latter being lowest when the former is either very low (weak
absorptive capacity) or very high (small distance to technological
frontier) (for details, see Bosetti et al., 2008 and the Appendix of this
paper). In turn, these international R&D spillovers provide a case for
international R&D policies.
WITCH accounts for higher social returns from R&D by calibrating
a higher marginal price of capital but on the other hand assumes an
exogenous crowding out of other forms of R&D. Thus, the implications
of biased technical change are not considered here, but they have
been evaluated in applications of WITCH on the direction and pace of
technical progress (Carraro et al., 2009a) and on human capital
formation (Carraro et al., 2009b). Nevertheless, it should be noted that
important additional R&D externalities, such as appropriability and
knowledge protection issues, are not captured due to the aggregated
structure of the model.
The second relevant modelling feature is the game-theoretic set up.
WITCH is able to produce two different solutions. The ﬁrst is the so-
called globally optimal solution, which assumes that countries fully
cooperate on global externalities. This is achieved by jointly
optimizing the global welfare (using Negishi weights to equalize
marginal utilities across regions). The second type of solution is a
decentralised one that is strategically optimal for each given region
(or coalition of regions) in response to all other regions' choices, and
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. This is achieved through an
iteration procedures in which each region (or coalition of regions)
maximizes its own welfare, taken as given global variables which are
computed ofﬂine the optimization. This modelling feature allows
accounting for externalities due to all global public goods (CO2,
international knowledge spillovers, energy markets, etc.…), making it
possible to model free-riding incentives and to internalize one or
more externality. This allows exploring the potential interactions
between different policies aimed at internalising the technological
externality and/or the climate externality.
Three types of R&D policies summarised in Table 1 are considered
in this paper, which differ in the type of R&D they subsidise:
1315V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 33 (2011) 1313–1320i) Energy efﬁciency enhancing R&D investments (E.E.). The model
assumes that an energy efﬁciency capital stock can be built
through dedicated R&D investments, which is a substitute for
physical energy (via a constant elasticity of substitution
production function) in producing ﬁnal energy demand.
ii) Wind, solar andCarbonCapture andStorageR&D investments (W+S
&CCS). Theproductivityofwind, solar andCCS canbedecreasedby
R&D investments, through a learning curve formulation for which
every given relative increase in the knowledge capital translates
into a constant decrease in investment costs.
iii) Breakthrough technologies R&D investments (Advanced Techs).
As with wind, solar and CCS, R&D decreases the cost of two
non-commercial, advanced carbon-free technologies. These
technologies can substitute for existing ones in the electricity
and non-electricity sectors, respectively.
It is important to emphasize that there exists considerable
uncertainty surrounding the appropriate way of modelling and
calibrating the drivers of technological change. In essence, there is
both speciﬁcation and parameter uncertainty. Speciﬁcation uncer-
tainty relates in particular to the modelling of R&D returns. The issue
of whether aggregate marginal returns to R&D are decreasing or
constant or even increasing is still being debated in the growth
literature. In WITCH, all three types of R&D expenditures mentioned
above display decreasing marginal returns. This is consistent with
available empirical evidence for low-carbon technologies such as
wind and solar power as well as for energy-saving innovation in the
United States (Popp, 2002). Diminishing returns to R&D in reducing
the costs of clean technologies is also justiﬁed by the fact that these
technologies (including renewable) rely on inputs, such as raw
materials or human capital, whose supply costs are constant or even
increase in deployment. These scarcities limit the ability of R&D to
keep increasing the efﬁciency of clean energy capital. Regarding
parameter uncertainty, in previous analysis (Bosetti et al., 2009b), we
have performed extensive sensitivity analysis on the key parameters,
both on those regulating diffusion and innovation. Themain ﬁnding of
that assessment, which is still relevant for the analysis of this paper, is
that essentially only the speciﬁcation of backstop technologies has a
signiﬁcant bearing on projected carbon prices and mitigation policy
costs.
With this tool in hand, we aspire to assess the three types of
innovation policies described in Table 1 in terms of both their
potential carbon emission abatement potential if used as stand-alone
policies, and the economic efﬁciency gains they can generate when
combined with an explicit climate stabilisation policy.
3. Climate effectiveness of innovation policies
We start by analysing the environmental effectiveness of standa-
lone innovation policies, looking at their impact on carbon emission
and concentration trajectories over the century. We simulate
innovation policies assuming global R&D funds of various sizes are
used to subsidize the three categories of Table 1. As a central value, we
use a fund size equal to 0.08% of Global World Product (GWP). This
share is consistent with the optimal R&D investments needed to
comply with a stringent climate stabilisation policy in the WITCH
model (Bosetti et al., 2009a), and is in linewith the peak level of public
energy R&D expenditures achieved across the OECD area in the early
1980s. Similar values have also been suggested in other recentTable 1
The three types of innovation policies considered in this paper.
Acronym Innovation policy features
E.E. R&D for energy efﬁciency enhancement
W+S and CCS R&D to improve productivity of wind, solar and CCS
Advanced techs R&D for advanced, breakthrough technologiesanalyses (IEA, 2008, 2010). For robustness check, and in order to
assess themaximumworld emission reduction that could be achieved
through a stand-alone innovation policy, we pursue additional
experiments with incrementally larger funds amounting to up to 2%
of GWP. The international R&D fund is assumed to be ﬁnanced by
contributions fromOECD regions that are proportional to their GDP. In
turn, each world region receives from the international R&D fund a
subsidy which adds to its own regional R&D investments in
innovation. The fund is distributed across regions on an equal per
capita basis, although alternative distribution rules were also tested to
check for robustness.
Figs. 1 and 2 report CO2 emissions and concentrations for the 4
innovation policies, as well as for the reference (BAU, no policy) and a
climate stabilisation pathway at 450 CO2 (about 535 CO2-e) ppmv.
The main result is that all innovation policies fall short of generating
the mitigation action needed to stabilise carbon concentrations. In all
cases, the atmospheric stock of CO2 keeps increasing and so does the
global temperature, which remains rather close to the baseline case.
There are differences across innovation policies, however. The
“Advanced Techs” R&D policy, under which two advanced technologies
become competitive via R&D investments, yields the higher mitigation
and manages to stabilise carbon emissions— albeit not concentrations.
Given the improvements needed and commercialisation lags, these
technologies become effectively available around mid-century, leading
to some emission reductions afterwards. The “W+S & CCS” R&D policy
achieves somewhat smaller reductions relative to BAU, and with a
different time proﬁle. Unlike new breakthrough technologies, wind,
solar and CCS can quickly penetrate the market if supported by R&D
subsidies, allowing some emission reductions during the ﬁrst half of the
century.
However, in the long term returns to R&D investments in both
technologies are somewhat counteracted by the costs due to
intermittency (for Wind and Solar) and storage repository (for CCS).
The last option, namely R&D dedicated to energy efﬁciency (E.E.), is
almost ineffective for two reasons. First, some decline in energy
intensity is already embedded in baseline scenarios, consistent with
the dynamics of the last 50 years. As a consequence, achieving
additional energy efﬁciency improvements via R&D is fairly expensive
at the margin. Second, efforts to decarbonise the economy will
ultimately be crucial to make a dent in emissions. This cannot be
achieved through improvements in energy efﬁciency alone, and
rather requires the progressive phasing-out of fossil-fuel-based
energy technologies.
While the above simulations assume sizeable R&D spending,
roughly four times higher than current public energy-relatedFig. 1. Fossil fuel emission paths under alternative innovation policies, compared with
emission paths in the baseline and 450 ppm CO2 only stabilisation cases.
Fig. 4. Economic beneﬁts (% difference of global consumption with BAU) of stand-alone
innovation policies, for an R&D fund equal to 0.08% of GWP.
Fig. 2. CO2 concentration paths under alternative innovation policies, compared with
emission paths in the baseline and 450 ppm CO2 only stabilisation cases.
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might overturn our conclusions. Likewise, mixed strategies combining
all three types of R&D could in principle deliver higher returns,
especially since alternative options differ in the time proﬁle and long-
run potential of the emission reductions they can achieve. We have
therefore carried out a number of sensitivity analyses, varying the size
and allocation of the technology fund. A very robust ﬁnding across all
simulations is that the largest achievable reduction in emissions with
respect to the baseline is in the order of 13%–14% in cumulated terms
throughout the century, in the range of the “Advanced Techs” case
discussed above. In particular, while a larger international R&D fund
induces larger emission reductions over the medium term, its long-
term impact is limited by decliningmarginal returns to R&D, as well as
to a lesser extent by the positive counteracting impact of the fund on
world GDP and emissions.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3 through a comparison between two
funds amounting to 2% of GWP and 0.2% respectively, both of which
are assumed to subsidise equally all three types of R&D. Although the
larger fund implies lower emissions in themedium term, by the end of
the century the two innovation policies result in similar and growingFig. 3. Fossil fuel emission paths for different sizes of a mixed innovation policy.emissions, due to the reallocation of consumption from earlier to later
periods in time. Furthermore, themedium-term impact of a large R&D
fund is insufﬁcient to put world emissions, even for the ﬁrst few
decades, on a path consistent with long-run stabilisation of carbon
concentrations at safe levels. These results reﬂect to a good extent the
assumption of diminishing returns to R&D already discussed above.
Moreover, rebound effects are also at play, with the increased
productivity fostering more growth and thus energy demand, not all
of which can be met by clean sources.4. Economic efﬁciency gains fromhybrid innovation/carbon pricing
policies
Although the simulation results from the previous section clearly
point to the lack of environmental effectiveness of R&D as a stand-
alone policy, R&Dmay still contribute to reducing the cost of a climate
policy package when used as a complement to carbon pricing policies.
The main reason is illustrated in Fig. 4, which shows the economic
gains from a fund amounting to 0.08% of GWP used as a stand-alone
policy. By internalising international technological externalities and
forcing higher innovation investments in earlier periods, innovation
policies deliver some welfare gains during the second half of the
century, at the expenses of initial losses. While these gains are small
under the “W+S & CCS” and “EE” innovation policies, they are
sizeable in the “Advanced Techs” case, which as discussed before also
achieves the largest emission reductions. Thus, R&D programs meant
to facilitate the development of breakthrough technologies that can
help decarbonise sectors such as transport appear to hold the largest
emission-reduction and cost-reduction potential.
It should be noted, however, that such policies still impose an
economic cost in the ﬁrst decades of the century, albeit a fairly small
one in this case. Funds of larger sizes generate higher early penalties;
for example, a fund of 2% of GWP as shown in Fig. 3 would yield
consumption losses of 2 to 3% and beneﬁts only after 2060.
The next sections assess the economic efﬁciency gains from hybrid
carbon pricing/innovation policies in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we
illustrate the innovation effects and economic impacts of a world
carbon price alone under a 450 ppm CO2 only (535 CO2 eq) carbon
concentration stabilisation target.3 In a second step, we estimate the3 We assume the existence of an international carbon market that equalizes
marginal abatement costs. Emission allowances are allocated on an equal per capita
basis.
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carbon price.
4.1. Innovation and economic costs under a climate stabilisation policy
alone
We begin by analysing the optimal investments in innovation
when a stringent climate stabilisation policy is considered.4 A policy of
this kind, although probably not sufﬁcient to maintain the global
temperature increase below the 2° Celsius threshold, does require an
immediate and rapid decarbonisation trajectory, for which currently
available mitigation options need to be supplemented with innova-
tion in low carbon technologies, especially in the transportation
sector. The resulting carbon price path is shown in Fig. 5. Themarginal
cost of CO2 increases throughout the century with the stringency of
the emission cuts, and is shown to be rather high in the second half of
the century.
The prospect of high carbon prices induces signiﬁcant increases in
R&D. For example, as shown in Fig. 6, public R&D expenditures are
found to quadruple with respect to baseline and, as a share of GDP, to
approach the peak levels of the early 1980s. Most of the R&D
undertaken is dedicated to the two backstop technologies, i.e. to
decarbonisation to both electricity and non-electricity, while R&D
dedicated to energy efﬁciency improvements is comparatively
smaller.
Similar level of investments and their repartition have been
recently suggested by other studies using different (mostly bottom-
up) approaches (IEA, 2009, 2010). These results depend on the
speciﬁcation of the R&D process, which as noted before has been
calibrated on empirical data. However, given the uncertainty
regarding the effectiveness of the R&D process across technologies,
we have also performed some sensitivity analysis to test the
robustness of the R&D investment path to the learning rates of the
breakthrough R&Ds (which are the most important ones). Fig. 7
shows the R&D investments for the central learning case, contrasted
with a high and low cases. The high learning rate has been set at 18%,
which represents the highest rate observed in the literature for the
case of combined cycle gas turbines during the 1980s (Jamasab, 2007).
The lowest rate was set at 8%, to ensure a mean preserving spread
around the central case (set at 13%). Results indicate that upward
trends in energy R&D are optimally induced by the climate policy4 We thus assume global cooperation in an international climate agreement, thus
abstracting from issues such as international carbon leakage or supply side response
from oil producers.irrespective of the magnitude of the learning rate, though differences
can be observed in the timing of the investment proﬁle. In particular,
when the productivity of R&D is higher, investments are anticipated,
but eventually fall to lower levels, thanks to the higher effectiveness of
the innovation. The opposite behaviour is observed for the low
learning rate case, in which investments are deterred by roughly
10 year, but are eventually increased to make up for the lower
effectiveness of R&D.
The observed response of R&D and technological change to carbon
pricing, in particular the emergence of the advanced technologies,
plays a major role in containing the costs of a climate stabilisation
policy. This is illustrated in Fig. 8, which compares the costs of the
climate policy under alternative assumptions regarding investment
possibilities in advanced technologies. One extreme scenario assumes
that the possibility to invest in such breakthrough technologies is
foregone altogether, while an intermediate scenario assumes that
R&D investment is still possible in the non-electricity technology.
Allowing R&D investments in the advanced technologies greatly
reduces mitigation costs at distant horizons, especially beyond mid-
century, at the cost of higher losses in the ﬁrst decades, due to the
large increase in R&D effort needed to bring about the breakthroughs.
A strong carbon price signal would still be needed in the short term
(in the order of 100$/tCO2 in 2030) to foster the large investments20
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Table 2
Investments in energy R&D (billion USD, average 2010–2050) for the two cases with
cooperation on only climate and on both climate and innovation. 450 CO2 policy.
OECD NON-OECD WORLD
Climate policy 47.7 40.0 87.7
Optimal policy 49.3 46.3 95.6
% difference 3% 16% 9%
1318 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 33 (2011) 1313–1320needed in both the available abatement opportunities and in the
advanced technology R&D programs.
The development of carbon-free technologies is especially impor-
tant in the non-electricity sector, where the marginal costs of
abatement are particularly high, a result which is also in line with
bottom-up analysis (IEA, 2010). Comparedwith a scenariowhere R&D
investments can be made in both advanced technologies, a simulation
where only the non-electricity carbon-free technology is available
leads to a small increase in mitigation costs. These results highlight
the importance of developing carbon-free technologies in the non-
electricity sector, notably in transport, where currently commercially
available mitigation options have only limited abatement potential.
Also, the electric sector already possesses a fairly rich technology
portfolio needed to achieve a stringent climate target, provided that
nuclear, CCS and renewables can be deployed on a sufﬁciently large
scale. This lowers the gains at the margin from investing in new
advanced technologies in that sector.5 Leaving aside the non-internalization of international R&D spillovers when regions
do not cooperate on innovation policy, R&D is set and allocated optimally in the model.
This assumes away domestic information, agency and political economy problems
which make it difﬁcult to select the good research programs and thereby reduce the
value of R&D in practice. From that perspective the simulated gains from R&D policies
should be seen as an upper bound. At the same time and as noted above, however, it
should be noted that the WITCH model's aggregate structure does not allow us to
model issues related to private underinvestment in R&D, which could in principle
increase the efﬁciency gains deriving from R&D policies.4.2. Economic efﬁciency gains from optimal hybrid innovation/carbon
pricing policies
Having shown that a carbon pricing approach would already
induce sizeable increases in overall R&D spending, which as a result
would signiﬁcantly reduce mitigation costs, we now assess the
economic efﬁciency gains of incorporating a global R&D policy on
top of the market based climate policy. From a policy standpoint, it is
reasonable to expect that if countries are willing to cooperate on
climate, they might also do so on innovation. However, these two
types of cooperation are normally not assessed together, and in what
follows our aim is to evaluate what beneﬁts this joint strategy can
accrue.
In order to do so,we compare two cooperative solutions of theWITCH
model, namely one featuring cooperation on both climate and R&D
policies– i.e. combining aworld carbonprice andaglobal R&D investment
strategy that internalises all international knowledge spillovers – and
another assuming cooperation on climate policy only — i.e. the climate
stabilisation policy considered in Section 4.1 above, which implicitly
assumes non-cooperative behaviour of each region in setting their R&D
spending.Comparedwith cooperation on climate policy only, we ﬁnd that an
optimal policy with cooperation on both innovation and climate
would yield somewhat higher energy R&D expenditures. As shown in
Table 2, on average global R&D investments increase by about 9 billion
USD a year, or 9%. The largest increases occur in non-OECD countries:
since these are far from the technological frontier, increased R&D
spending enhances their ability to absorb the world knowledge pool.
OECD countries also raise their innovation effort, although to a less
extent, given their lower marginal returns to R&D investments. The
highest change occurs during the initial periods, up to 2020.
In economic terms, cooperation on both innovation and climate
reduces the costs of climatemitigation, because it allows to internalize
both the climate and innovation externalities. Global consumption
losses overt the century (in net present value at 3% discount rate) are
reduced from 1.92% to 1.74%, an efﬁciency gain of 10%, or equivalently
6 trillion USD. These numbers conﬁrm that combining carbon pricing
and R&D policies can yield welfare gains, but that carbon pricing alone
could go a long way in determining the optimal investment portfolio
consistent with climate stabilisation (Popp, 2006).
4.3. Economic efﬁciency gains from realistic hybrid innovation/carbon
pricing policies
The 10% potential reduction in climate change mitigation costs
from a global R&D policy estimated in the previous version is largely
theoretical. Indeed, while cooperation on climate change “merely”
requires setting up a single world carbon price, in principle
cooperation on R&D requires an omniscient world social planner
that sets an optimal level of global R&D and allocates it optimally
across time, regions and types of R&D. This is extremely unlikely to be
achievable in the real world, and as such the 10% represents at best an
upper bound.5
It is therefore instructive to assess the economic efﬁciency gain
that could be achieved by a more plausible global R&D policy, and to
compare it with the maximum theoretical gain. To this end, we
assume a global fund making a constant share of GWP, ﬁnanced by
OECD countries, allocated to each region on a per-capita basis, and
spent only on breakthrough technologies, which we have shown have
the largest cost-saving potential compared to alternatives. The results
from such simulations in terms of efﬁciency gains carried out for a
range of fund sizes are reported in Fig. 9.
Compared to the optimal global R&D policy analysed in the
previous paragraph, the “realistic” R&D fund would have a smaller
impact on mitigation policy costs, reducing the global cost of meeting
the stabilisation target by at most 3–3.5% relative to cooperation on
climate policy only. This reduction in policy costs is found to be
highest for a fund of about 0.07% of GWP, roughly in line with those
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Fig. 9. Economic efﬁciency gains (% difference in discounted consumption relative to
cooperation on climate policy only) from a global R&D fund dedicated to breakthrough
technologies, under a 450 ppm CO2 (535 ppm CO2eq) concentration stabilisation
constraint and for different fund sizes.
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smaller than the one shown for the optimal case, given the different
regional repartition. Higher spending is not found to be efﬁcient due
to decreasing marginal returns to R&D. Overall, the small cost
reduction achieved by the simple R&D fund compared with the
maximum achievable savings highlights the importance of allocating
spending optimally across time, regions and different types of R&D.4.4. Economic efﬁciency gains from optimal hybrid innovation/carbon
pricing policies for a looser climate objective
Our results so far have indicated that innovation is a key ingredient
to climate stabilisation, and that substantial investments in energy-
related R&D are needed to bring about the productivity changes
required by low emission targets. As such, combining climate and
innovation policies yields additional beneﬁts, but those would be
bounded by the high levels of investments already occurring in the
climate scenarios. Indeed, our estimates have suggested that for a
climate objective of 450 CO2 only (535 CO2-eq) the efﬁciency gains of
coupling innovation and climate policies would at best equal 10%.
However, the policy considered is a quite severe one, and one might
wonder how results would change if a looser climate objective were
considered.
As a ﬁnal task, we investigate amilder climate objective of 550 CO2
only (about 650 CO2-eq) and again compare the case of cooperation
on climate only with that of cooperation on both climate and
innovation. Table 3 (the counterpart of Table 2) shows the R&D
investments in the two scenarios. Once again, the optimal policy
implies more investments in R&D than in the climate policy only.
However, the global increase in investment is now in the order of 20%,
twice as much as under the more stringent climate objective, and also
higher in levels (+12.6 billions/yr), despite the fact that overall R&D
investments are lower given the less ambitious climate target. The
largest increase again occurs in developing countries, but developed
ones also raise their investment levels.
In terms of macro-economic repercussions, the “full cooperation”
and “climate cooperation only” set-ups yield consumption losses of
0.3% and 0.39%, respectively. Thus, the relative efﬁciency gain is about
30%, signiﬁcantly higher than under the more stringent climate policyTable 3
Investments in energy R&D (billion USD, average 2010–2050) for the two policies with
cooperation on only climate and on both climate and innovation. 550 CO2 policy.
OECD Non-OECD World
Climate policy 35.2 29.4 64.6
Optimal policy 38.4 38.8 77.2
% difference 9% 32% 20%scenario. In levels, however, the gains from coupling climate and
innovation policies are twice as small under the less stringent target
as under the more stringent one, speciﬁcally 3 trillion USD compared
to 6. The value of R&D in relative terms decreases with the stringency
of the climate objective due to decreasing returns to innovation.
However, since abatement costs are highly nonlinear, as exempliﬁed
by the steep path of carbon prices, the actual savings in dollar value
from coupling climate and innovation policies are higher under more
ambitious targets.
5. Conclusion
This paper has used WITCH, a global integrated assessment model
featuring multiple externalities and endogenous technological
change, to assess the potential for innovation policies to mitigate
climate change or to lower the cost of doing so. Two main results
stand out. First, innovation policies alone are unlikely to effectively
control climate change. Even under large increases in global climate-
related R&D spending, emissions can be at best stabilised above
current levels and CO2 concentration be reduced by about 50 ppm
relative to baseline by 2100 (from over 700 ppm to about 650 ppm, or
over 750 ppm CO2eq). The decarbonisation of energy needed to meet
stringent global emission reduction objectives has to be achieved at
least partly by pricing carbon.
Second, relative to cooperation on emission reduction alone
(through global carbon pricing), international cooperation on R&D
(through a global R&D policy that would internalise international
knowledge spillovers) might bring about additional beneﬁts, of about
10% (or 6 USD Trillions) for a stringent climate policy and 30% (or 3
USD Trillions) for a looser one. However, such an optimal global R&D
policy is difﬁcult to achieve in practice, and under more realistic
assumptions about the allocation of spending across time, countries
and types of R&D, the magnitude of efﬁciency gains are signiﬁcantly
reduced. This is because global carbon pricing alone is shown to have
the potential to trigger substantial increases in R&D expenditures,
which implies that further spending under a global R&D policy would
run into decreasing marginal returns.
These ﬁndings are qualitatively robust to sensitivity analysis on
key model parameters, notably returns to R&D, learning rates and
international knowledge spillovers in the various technological areas
(see Bosetti et al., 2009b). At the same time, some limitations to our
analysis should be acknowledged, which call for caution in interpret-
ing our quantitative results. While assumed away in this paper,
increasing returns to R&D cannot be fully ruled out, and the
magnitude of international R&D spillovers – a key justiﬁcation for
global policy intervention in climate-related R&D – remains highly
uncertain for lack of empirical evidence. Also, the model assumes
away some domestic innovation failures that in practice might
provide a stronger case for R&D policy intervention than found in
this paper — although it also ignores the information, agency and
political economy problems that often undermine the effectiveness of
public R&D programs in practice. Such failures typically affect any
type of innovation, but may bemagniﬁed in the area of climate change
mitigation, such as appropriability problems (lack of credibility of
intellectual property rights on key mitigation technologies that might
emerge in the future), lack of credibility of carbon pricing policies
(due to the impossibility for current governments to commit credibly
to a future carbon price path), or failures speciﬁc to the electricity
sector (network effects and thereby entry barriers associated with
already installed infrastructure, cumulative nature of knowledge, …
etc.). It is however unclear whether the overall impact of credibility
problems and lack of speciﬁc infrastructures would enhance or reduce
R&D investments (different effects have sometimes opposite signs)
and therefore would increase or reduce the effectiveness of technical
change on climate change control. Further research is needed to
explore these issues.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2011.02.010.
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